...
None of these alternatives by themselves seems to guarantee long-term institutional reforms and continuity over time, attacking the main Argentine problems. Maybe a combination of them? A serious fiscal rearrangement in spending and taxes, a deregulatory shock and a profound monetary reform that trigger growth, followed by a Fiscal Pact in the form of an agreement law that modifies the federal tax co-participation system and at the same time imposes limits on public spending, indebtedness, and the creation of new taxes or increases in existing ones. Deregulation, free trade agreements.
Such reforms require an enormous political effort. This is what the magnitude of Argentina's decadence demands. Without a doubt, it is necessary to obtain multiple supports, not only electoral, but starting with public opinion. There is talk of the need to reach consensus, which is obvious since reforms of this type require the approval of many, or at least avoid rejection. Such a consensus could have at least two versions.
One of them would include a shared government during the entire period of approval and management of the reforms, say, a full presidential term. It seems difficult to achieve and it promises, very likely, a “neither chicha, nor lemonade” consensus that would not solve the core problems, would maintain the existing privileges and protections, and would generate timid reforms with timid results. It could be achieved if the opposition preferred not to appear blocking the success, or rather promoting the failure, of the new government, but it is doubtful that it will give us that aforementioned path of reform.
Another could be an option that we call a “blank check”: the opposition agrees to facilitate, or not obstruct, the parliamentary approval of a package of profound reforms (tax, co-participation, monetary, exchange, labor, pension, regulatory, energy, commercial, infrastructure) and the government manages them during its mandate without much need to resort to that support again.
The advantage of this option is that it generates less political cost for the opposition and would unleash an immediate change in expectations, a "confidence shock" that would give credence to advancing the reforms and weaken the vested interests that will do everything possible to stop them. What opposition would be willing to approve these reforms if they can result in a change of course that strengthens those who carry them out and, therefore, weakens those who were left out? Well, one who thinks that those changes are going to lead to failure for those who implement them. Interestingly, a bit of cynicism could contribute to the process.
Nobility obliges. A recently elected government, with majority support, should be able to carry out what it proposed to the voters. Sure, if they proposed it, of course. To do so, and clearly, the election would also have to be a plebiscite of the proposed program. The first consensus that needs to be achieved is that of public opinion. The key is that the majority that considers the current situation negatively becomes a positive majority in favor of the changes.
It is a much bigger challenge. Criticism is easy when a government is exposed to one error after another, playing in favor of the changes that are necessary requires much more. Let's get the blood out of Churchill's phrase: it takes sweat and tears.
End
