Second, that the reforms act like a lock, making it very difficult to retrace the path. Convertibility was not enough, dollarization with a choice of currencies would be something much more difficult: Correa could not back down in Ecuador, Bukele in El Salvador either. It is not bulletproof: Robert Mugabe imposed it and then “de-dollarized” it in Zimbabwe. We ourselves have seen “zero deficit” laws passed that did not even get put into real operation before the storm took them away. Macri's Fiscal Pact was repealed by many of those who had originally voted for it.
The third option should be ruled out before we start talking: to carry out institutional reforms through constitutional reform. The reason is simple: if a constitutional review period were opened in Argentina, the current Chilean experience would be an example of sanity regarding what could be obtained here. The "rights" of countless groups would be multiplied in such a way that they would overshadow the growth of inflation and the "obligations" would be non-existent, except for more taxes to pay them. James Buchanan, Nobel Prize in Economics in 1986, proposed incorporating fiscal discipline measures, such as limits on the growth of public spending, the fiscal deficit, and debt, but at the constitutional level, in such a way that it would be much more difficult to remove them. Interesting, but impossible because of the above.
That Fiscal Pact would have been different if it had been approved as an "agreement law" that, although it appears in Article 75, paragraph 2 of the National Constitution for changes in the federal co-participation system, the jurists will say if it could be extended to reform that system and impose restrictions on spending and indebtedness, both by the provincial governments and the national government. The requirement of approval by an absolute majority of the members of each chamber and of all the provinces makes it somewhat more difficult to modify than the Constitution itself. Of course, also difficult to pass.
